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FUTURE INTERESTS IN INDIANA'
BERNARD

C.

GAVIT*

II

As was pointed out in the beginning of this article the question
as to the creation of a future interest is closely bound up with
rules of interpretation and construction, and presumptions employed by the court in attempting to discover the intention of
the testator. Discovering the intention of the testator is the
greatest sport known to the law, unless it be the kindred sport
of ascertaining the intention of the legislature. Ordinarily,
of course, what is done is not to discover the intention of the
testator, but it is to find out what the testator would have intended had he known, or had his lawyer known, what he was
about. One man's guess on that score is about as nearly correct
as another's. It is therefore quite difficult to successfully quarrel
with a vast majority of the decisions as to the proper interpretation or construction of a will.80
DEATH DURING THE LIFE OF THE TESTATOR
By far the most valuable rule on the subject is the one which
says that a devise over upon the death of the first taker refers
to his death during the lifetime of the testator.
The first case in Indiana to apply the rule is Harris v. Car2
penter.8 1 The leading cases are undoubtedly Fowler v Duhme,8
3
The rule has been applied correctly
and Alfred v. Sylvester.
84
in the cases collected in the note.
I Continued from April issue, 3 Ind. L. Jour. 505.
* See biographical note, p. 549.

sO For a collection of the general rules on the subject see Billings v.
Deputy, 85 Ind. App. 248 (1925), at p. 252.
81109 Ind. 540 (1886).

143 Ind. 248.
184 Ind. 542.
84 Hoover v. Hoover, 116 Ind. 498 (1888), Wright v. Charley, 129 Ind.
257 (1891), Borgner v. Brown, 133 Ind. 391 (1891); Moores v. Hare, 144
Ind. 573 (1895), Antioch College v. Branson, 145 Ind. 312 (1896), Moore
v. Gary, 149 Ind. 51 (1897), Morgan v. Robbns, 152 Ind. 362 (1898),
Teal v. Richardson, 160 Ind. 119 (1902), Hall v. Brownlee, 164 Ind. 238
82
83
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In each of the cases below the rule should have been applied
but was entirely overlooked.8 G
The case of Bray v Miles,8 6 is a curious example of wasted
energy. In that case T gave to W for life, and remainder to
D and S, and "in the event of the death of either the share due
such to go to the children of such deceased person, if there be
children, and if no children then to the survivor." Both D and
S survived T. D died during the life of W, having adopted a
child prior to the death of T. S claimed the entire remainder
on the theory that the adopted child was not a child within the
meaning of the will. The court consumes fifty pages in deciding
that the adopted child took under the will as a child of D. But
quite obviously the death of D referred to a death during the
lifetime of T. D therefore having survived T took a fee simple,
and the adopted child took as an heir of D, and not as a child
under the will.
A few of the cases should be noticed where there is some question as to the correctness of the application of the rule. In
Vaubel v Lang,8 7 the court refused to apply the rule. In that
case T devised to GS and GD, "to have and to hold subject to the
following conditions, in case either die leaving no child or children surviving, then that share to go to the other, and if both
die without children, then to my heirs." The court says,88
"Where real estate is devised in terms denoting an intention that
the primary devisee shall take a fee on the death of the testator,
coupled with a devise over in case of his death without issue,
(1904), Taylor v. Stephens, 165 Ind. 200 (1905), Clark v. Thseme, 181
Ind. 163 (1913), Bun-ell v. Jean, 196 Ind. 187 (1924); Burke v. Barrett, 31
Ind. App. 635 (1903), Thseme v. Unon Trust Co., 32 Ind. App. 522 (1903);
Burton v. Carnahan, 38 Ind. App. 612 (1906), Aneshaensel v. Twyman,
42 Ind. App. 354 (1908); Buswk v. Buswk, 65 Ind. App. 655 (1917); Hall
v. Bauchert, 67 Ind. App. 201 (1917), Boren v. Reeves, 73 Ind. App. 604
(1919), Raub v. Rodabaugh, 185 Ind. 513 (1916).
85 Jones v. Miller, 13 Ind. 337 (1859), Smith v. Hunter, 23 Ind. 580
(1864), Huxford v. Milligan, 50 Ind. 542 (1874), Greer v. Wilson, 108 Ind.
322 (1886); Underwood v. Robbsns, 117 Ind. 308 (1888), Pate v. French,
122 Ind. 10 (1889); Aspey v. Leuns, 152 Ind. 493 (1898); Bray v. Miles,
23 Ind. App. 432 (1899); Bennznghoff v. Evangelical Assoc., 28 Ind. App.
374 (1901), Bonner v. Bonner, 28 Ind. App. 147 (1901) ; Colvz v. Springer,
28 Ind. App. 443 (1901), Pulse v. Osbon, 30 Ind. App. 633 (1902), Paul
v. Dickznson, 63 Ind. App. 230 (1916).
86 23 Ind. App. 432 (1899)
87 81 Ind. App. 96 (1923).
88 At p. 100, et seq.
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courts will hold that the words refer to a death without issue
during the lifetime of the testator, unless the contrary appears
from the will itself. The testator in the instant case-provided
that the primary devisees were 'to have and to hold the said
real estate to the following conditions.' The fact that they, as
devisees, were 'to have and to hold' said real estate, subject
to certain conditions, a thing they could not do until after the
death of the testator, makes it clear that it was not his intention
that the occurrence of the event in question should be confined
to the time preceding his death. We are fully justified in so
holding, without reference to the tendency of courts to seize
upon slight circumstances disclosed by wills, in order to avoid
the necessity of supplying an omission as to the time of such
event, under an arbitrary and artificial rule."
In that case the court clearly holds that slight evidence from
the language of the will is sufficient to defeat the rule. In the
case of Alfred v. Sylvester,8 9 the court says, 90 "Words of survivorship are presumed to relate to the death of the testator,
rather than that of the first taker, if they are fairly capable
of such interpretation." The language of the will there was, 'to
X for life and at her death the land to be sold and proceeds to be
divided equally among A, B and C, but if either die before X
then over,' and the court there applied the rule in question, overruling Corey v. Springer,91 where a contrary result was reached
on a quite similar will, and also the cases of Jones v. Miller,92
and Smith v. Hunter,9 3 where the rule should have been applied
but was not mentioned.
The Vaubel v. Lang case does not discuss the Alfred v. Sylvester case, and it is very apparent that there is quite a conflict
in the theories back of the two decisions. The first case above
mentioned is also in conflict with the case of Campbell v. Bradford,94 where the rule was applied despite the fact that the will
provided that the "surviving son shall inherit all my real estate
at the death of my wife," and also the case of Paul v. Dickinson
Trust Company,9 5 where the rule was applied where the limitaInd. 542 (1915).
90 At p.549.
89 184

91138 Ind. 506 (1894).

13 Ind. 337.
93 23 Ind. 580.
94 166 Ind. 451 (1905).
95 63 Ind. App. 230 (1916).
92
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tion was to D for life and at her death to her children should
she leave any living, and if not then to her grandchildren. It
is submitted that these last two cases are incorrectly decided.
If they be correct then it would be impossible to create any life
estate in the first taker.
u the court said, "It not being mansfest
In Duzan v. Chappel,!9
that T meant the death of S at any other time we think it must
be held to have reference to the death of S during the life of the
widow, and that in case he survived her the remainder in fee
should absolutely vest in him." And in Curry v. Curry, 97 the
court held that the rule in question was one of intentiion, to be
gathered from the entire will, and was to be applied only where
it appeared that such was the intention of the testator. Certainly the language of these cases is at variance with Alfred v.
Sylvester.
It is to be noted that these two latter cases and the Vaubel v.
Lang case are Appellate Court cases, and that only in the Curry
case was there a petition for transfer to the Supreme Court
which was denied. The theory and result of all of the Supreme
Court cases are that the rule is to be applied without inquiring
into the actual intention of the testator, apparently upon a more
or less conclusive presumption that he meant a death during
the lifetime of the testator. An opposite construction would
reach the same result in most cases for the usual limitation is
"if he die without issue," which would be construed to be an
indefinite failure of issue invalid under the rule of Huxford v.
Milligan.'" On the other hand the Appellate Court cases seem
to be on the theory that if there is any presumption it is against
the application of the rule, except where no other interpretation
is admissible.
There apparently is no ma.ority rule on the question, the
authorities in other states being about evenly divided, some
holding that such language prima facie refers to a death during
the life of the testator, and some holding that it may refer to
death after as well as before the death of the testator. Most
authorities agree however that the question is finally one of
intention to be determined from the entire will. 90
96 41 Ind. App. 651 (1907).
97 58 Ind. App. 567 (1914)
98 50 Ind. 542, supra.
99 Tiff. Real Property, 2nd Ed. Vol. 1, Sec. 166.
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VESTED AND CONTINGENT REMAINDERS AND
EXECUTORY INTERESTS
Of equal importance with the rule last discussed is the one
which says that there is a presumption in favor of the vesting
of estates. Thus words of futurity are construed as pnma facie
referring to the enjoyment of the estate, and not to its vesting. 0 0 Even an estate given to S, "provided he attains 21," is
construed as a vested estate subject to a condition subsequent.' 0 '
Likewise if the words are "in the event he live to be 21. ' 102 Likewise if the estate is to several children "until they arrive at 21,
and to the survivors at 21."'0:
A direction to sell after a life estate and divide among children
or others, gives a vested interest.0 4 And in general any limitation to take effect at or upon the termination of a prior
estate is construed as referring merely to the possession of the
estate, and not to its vesting0o
However, a remainder will be construed as contingent if such
is the intention of the testator or grantor. 0 6
The case of Davidson v. Koehler, 10 7 followed in Davidson v.

Bates,108 holds a remainder vested which is quite clearly contingent.
But if, of course, the estate cannot take effect as a contingent
remainder, and is limited to cut down a previous estate, and must
1o10
Paul v. Dickinson Trust Company, 63 Ind. App. 230 (1916).
101 Boling v. Miller, 133 Ind. 602 (1892)
1'2 Chambers v. Chambers, 139 Ind. 111 (1894).
103 Silvers v. Canary, 114 Ind. 129 (1888)
"'4 Rumsey v. Durham, 5 Ind. 71 (1854),
Wilson v. Rudd, 19 Ind. 101
(1862), Heilinan v. Heilman, 129 Ind. 59 (1891), Comer v.Light, 175 Ind.
367 (1910), Nelson v. Nelson, 36 Ind. App. 331 (1905), Walling v. Scott,
50 Ind. App. 23 (1912), French v. French, 58 Ind. App. 621 (1915)
105Rush v. Rush, 40 Ind. 83 (1872); Bruce v. Bissell, 119 Ind. 525
(1889); Myers v. Carney, 171 Ind. 379 (1908), Timmons v. Timmons, 49
Ind. App. 21 (1911), Harness v. Harness, 50 Ind. App. 364 (1912), Wheatcraft v. Wheatcraft, 55 Ind. App. 283 (1913), Paul v. Dickinson Trust Co.,
63 Ind. App. 230 (1916), Hardy v. Smith, 71 Ind. App. 688 (1919); Kemp
v. Goodnight, 168 Ind. 174 (1906), Allen v. Mayfield, 21 Ind. 293 (1863);
Thseband v. Sebastian, 10 Ind. 455 (1858); Gmffin v. Lynch, 16 Ind. 396
(1861), Miller v. Harland, 78 Ind. App. 56 (1921)
106 Clark v. Barton, 51 Ind. 165 (1875), Helm v. Frisbie, 59 Ind. 526
(1877), Carson v. McCaslin, 60 Ind. 334 (1878); Cox v. Bird, 65 Ind. 277
(1879), Wood v. Robertson, 113 Ind. 323 (1887), Shannon v. Bonham,
27 Ind. App. 369 (1901), Sexton v. Cronkhite, 74 Ind. App. 245 (1920),
Hackelman v. Hackelman, Ind. App., 146 N. E. 590 (1925) (pending on a
petition to transfer).
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consequently take effect as an executory interest, it will be so
construed, and the limitation is given that effect.109
Nowhere in the Indiana cases is there any adequate discussion
of the difference between an executory interest and a contingent
remainder, although in general there has been a correct recognition of the difference between the two. "A contingent remainder is merely the possibility of an estate," which is limited
to take effect as a remainder upon the termination of some
previous estate in freehold. Its vesting is either subject to a
condition precedent, or subject to the determination as to what
person will be the remainderman. 110 "An executory interest
is the possibility or prospect of an estate, which exists by reason of the limitation of a freehold estate subject to a condition
precedent, and which cannot be regarded as a contingent remainder.""' That is, it is not limited to take effect, if at all,
on the termination of a prior estate in freehold, but operates
to cut off or divest a prior estate. Executory interests were
unrecognized at common law due to the prohibition against the
abeyance of the seisin, but became valid under the Statute of
1 12
Uses and the Statute of Wills.
Sections 37 and 38, Chap. 23, Vol. 1, Revised Stat. 1852,113
are obvious attempts to do away with the law of seisin in
Indiana. They provide: "A freehold estate as well as a chattel
real, may be created to commence at a future day; and an
estate for life may be created in a term of years, with or without the intervention of a precedent estate, and a remainder limited thereon; a remainder of a freehold or chattel real, either
contingent or vested, may be created, expectant on the termination of a term of years. A remainder may be limited on a
contingency, which in case it should happen will operate to
abridge or determine the precedent estate."
10776 Ind. 398 (1881).
108111 Ind. 391 (1887).
109 Johnson v. Johnson, 128 Ind. 93 (1890),

Esseck v. Caple, 131 Ind.

207 (1891), Hayes v. Martz, 173 Ind. 279 (1909); Caimn v. Springer, 28
Ind. App. 443 (1901), Pulse v. Osborn, 30 Ind. App. 633 (1902); Hillis p,
Dils, 53 Ind. App. 576 (1913), Thompson v. Jamison, 31 Ind. App. 376
(1903); Nickerson v. Hoover, 70 Ind. App. 343 (1917), Curry v. Curri
58 Ind. App. 567 (1914).
110 Tiff. Real Prop., 2nd Ed. Vol. 1, Sec. 136.
M11
Tiff. Real Prop., 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, Sec. 163.
see Alsman v. Walters, 184 Ind. 565 (1915) at p. 568:
a fee may be in abeyance is not without Common Law authority."
112 But
113

Sections 13413 and 13414, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.

"That
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It is clear that the word "remainder" in Section 38 is a misnomer, and will have to be construed to mean "executory in!
terest." The word "remainder" is used in the succeeding section of the statute, being the so-called "Statute against Perpetuities." It has been discussed in the first part of this paper.
Its use in Section 38 is additional evidence that the words
"contingent remainder" in Section 40 (being the so-called Statute against Perpetuities) must be read "executory interest."
The effect of the statute undoubtedly is to allow the creation
of remainders, not limited on a prior freehold estate, and of
executory interests by deed without the use of a trustee. And
there is a dictum to the effect that it permits the creation of a
contingent remainder in a deed and after a vested estate for
life to the "heirs" of a living person. 114 Clearly the statute
could have no effect in such a case, because there was no previous estate not of freehold, and such a contingent remainder
was good at common law.115
GIFTS TO A CLASS
A deed to B and his children includes only the children living
at the time. "A grant of an immediate estate to a person not
in existence is void.""16 Likewise a deed to D and her "present
heirs," gives a vested estate to D and her children as tenants in
common.1 1? And a present gift by will to "the children of C"
vests on the death of the testator, and descendants of the deceased children of C do not take. 118 And a gift to the "heirs"
of a living person will ordinarily be construed to give a vested
interest in the children of such person." 9
But a gift to a class to be divided equally among those who
may be living at the time of distribution, of course, includes
after born children. 20 And the interest of one who dies before
12
distribution under such a gift is divested. '
If a legacy is payable at a certain date in the future, with
a gift over to a class in the event the legatee dies, the class
acquires a vested interest, but the legacy is still payable at the
114 Miller v. Harland,78 Ind. App. 56 (1921).

115 Tiff. Real Prop., 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, p. 488.

116 Glass v. Glass, 71 Ind. 392 (1880).
117 Fountain Co. Coal Co. v. Becklehe ner, 102 Ind. 76 (1885).
11s Pugh v. Pugh, 105 Ind. 552 (1885).
119 Miller v. Harland, 78 Ind. App. 56 (1921).
120 Goodwrn 'v. Goodwin, 48 Ind. 584 (1874).
121 Miller v. Keegan, 14 Ind. 502 (1860).
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original date set.122 But if the distribution is deferred, and
the gift is to a class, the class is determined as of the date of
123
the distribution, and children born after that date do not take.
If there is gift to a class at the termination of a life estate
there is a vested estate created, so that the heirs of a member
of the class who dies before the termination of the life estate
takes the ancestor's interest. 12 4 If there is no member of the
class in existence at the death of the testator upon the birth
of a child the estate vests, subject to open up to let in all5 children
12
born before the estate vests in the class in possession.
But the gift may be contingent, so that no member of the
class takes a vested interest, and only those who survive to
126
the time of distribution take. '
In ascertaining whether the class takes per sthrpes or per
capita the Indiana courts have laid down the following rules.
"They take per stsirpes unless the language of the will is such
as to exclude that intention."' 127 "If the will is ambiguous they
take per stzrpes, as the courts will favor that construction which
will follow the Statute of Descents." 128 But the courts will give
effect to a provision for distribution per capita, if such an intention is clear'12 9 Generally, however, where the devise is to
several persons belonging to different classes, bearing different
relationships to the testator, then the presumption is that he
intended it to go per stirpes, and if they stand in the same relation to the testator, then the presumption is that he intended
it to go per capita.130
A gift to children "or their descendants," will usually be construed to give an estate to the children per stirpes. That is,
'"or" is construed to mean "and," so that children of any deceased child takes the parent's share, and it is not necessary
122

Cann v. Fidler, 62 Ind. 116 (1878)

123 Williams v. Harrtson, 72 Ind. App. 245 (1919)
124 Clore v. Smith, 45 Ind. App. 340 (1909),
Smith v. Smith, 59 Ind.
App. 169 (1915), Amos v. Amos, 117 Ind. 19 (1888)
125 Jones v. Chandler, 61 Ind. App. 500 (1915),
McCoy v. Houck, 180
Ind. 634 (1913) (overruling Devn v. McCoy, 48 Ind. App. 379), Coquillard
v. Coquillard, 62 Ind. App. 426 (1916), Alsman v. Walters, 184 Ind. 565
(1915).
126 Citizens Loan, etc. Co. v. Herron, 186 Ind. 421 (1917).
127 Henry v. Thomas, 118 Ind. 23 (1888)
128 Kilgore v. Kilgore, 127 Ind. 276 (1890).
129 Rohre v. Burrs, 27 Ind. App. 344 (1901)
130 Laisure v. Richards, 56 Ind. App. 301 (1913).

FUTURE INTERESTS IN INDIANA

that all of the children die so that the grandchildren will take
1
under the will. 13
Ordinarily where there is a gift to several with a limitation
over to the survivors, the word "survivors" will be construed
to mean "others" so that the heirs of one who has previously
died take the ancestor's share, although strictly speaking they
are not "survivors. ' 3 - The result, of course, is always an
answer to the question as to what was the testator's intention.
There is only one Indiana case on the subject, and there the
court without any discussion gave the word "survivor" its
strict meaning. There was a devise to A, B and C, and upon
the death of any without issue the share to go to the survivors,
and on the death of any with issue his share to go to his children.
A died without issue, B died leaving a child. C died without
issue, and the child of B claimed all. The court held that the
child of B did not take C's share, for she was not a "survivor."'1 33 There was no discussion of the question of the effect
of the phrase "die without issue", and it was assumed that what
was meant was a definite failure of issue.
ALTERNATIVE, CROSS AND IMPLIED REMAINDERS
AND EXECUTORY INTERESTS
Contingent remainders, and executory interests may be limited in the alternative, so that one may take effect if the other
does not. There is some dissension among the authorities as to
whether or not, if the remainders be in fee, either can be considered as vested. 3 4 In the only Indiana case where there is
any discussion of the subject, there was a devise to W, and after
her death to S, if living, and if W survive S, then to W absolutely, and the court there held that W took a life estate, with
a contingent remainder to S, with contingent remainder to W. 135
Where there is a gift to several, with the ultimate right to
possession and title in one, there are created what have been
termed "cross-remainders." The interesting question is whether
or not cross-remainders will be implied, when the will does not
':, Stephens v. .lodon, 79 Ind. App. 596 (1923), Snyder v. Greendale
Sec. 3505, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat.
Land Co., 48 Ind. App. 178 (1911)
1926 is a codification of this rule.
132 Tiff. Real Prop., 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, Sec. 169.
133 Cooper v. Hayes, 96 Ind. 386 (1884).
134 Tiff. Real Prop., 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, Sec. 142.
135 Hammond v. Croxton, 162 Ind. 353 (1903).
See also, Abernathy
v. McCoy (Ind. App. 1926), 154 N. E. 682.
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specifically provide for them. 3 6 In Bailey v. Sanger,13 7 the
Indiana court refused to imply a cross-remainder. They will
not be implied in the case of a deed. 138
But a remainder may be implied to take effect on a contingency
not named by the testator, where the entire will justifies it.
Thus, where a life estate was given to W for life, and "if she
die before the youngest child becomes of age, then and in that
case to be divided equally among three sons," and W survived
the time when the youngest child became of age, it was held that
nevertheless the three sons took the remainder. 13 9 But where a
will contained a devise to H for life, "and if H survive me, then
at his death to D," and H predeceased W, it was held that the
contingency must be strictly construed and that D did not
0
take.14
Where there was a limitation to W so long as she remained
unmarried, and on her death to D, and W remarried, the court
held that "on her death" meant "on the termination of W's
estate," and that D took immediately.' 4' This is what is known
as an "acceleration of remainder." The question most often
arises when a widow is given a life estate, and elects to take
under the law in fee. Here the law accelerates the remainder
as to the balance of the fee, giving to the remaindermen after
the life estate an immediate estate in the balance. 42 (To avoid
any question on this score a will ought always to provide that
a remainder is to vest in possession upon the termination of the
preceding estate for any reason.)
43
An interesting case in this field is that of Hedges v. Payne.
In that case the testator gave the residue of his estate to a
brother and sister, share and share alike, and "if B die before
my death, then all to S." S died before T, and B survived T,
and claimed the entire residuary estate. The court there decided
that it was bound by the prior decisions of West v. West, 44 and
Holbrook v. McCleary,145 holding that on the death of one residuary devisee the devise lapses and the lapsed devise vests in the
136 Tiff. Real Prop., 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, Sec. 143.
137 108 Ind. 264 (1886)
188 Vents v. Talbert, 76 Ind. App. 123 (1921)
139 Jackson v. Hoover, 26 Ind. 511 (1866)
140 Gibson v. Seymour, 102 Ind. 485 (1885)
To the same effect is
the case of Beatty v. Irwn, 35 Ind. App. 238 (1904)
141 Nagle v. Hirsch, 59 Ind. App. 282 (1915).
142 Tiff. Real Prop., 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, Sec. 146.
148 85 Ind. App. 394 (1926).
144 89 Ind. 529 (1883).
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surviving residuary devisee. 146 That is, the law of lapsed devises reached the same result as an implied condition would
have. If there is no residuary clause then the devise lapses,
147
and the estate goes to the heirs.
It is to be noted that the above decisions are seriously limited
by Section 3505 Burns' Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926, which provides,
"Whenever any estate real or personal, shall be devised to any
descendant of the testator, and such devisee shall die during the
lifetime of the testator, leaving a descendant who shall survive
the testator, such devise shall not lapse, but the property so
devised shall vest in the surviving descendant of the devisee
as if such devisee had survived the testator and died intestate." 48 "Devise" and "devisee" clearly here mean also "legacy"
149
and "legatee." They would be so construed if used in a will.
IMPOSSIBLE AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS
An estate limited upon a condition, either precedent or subsequent, which has become impossible of performance, will take
effect without compliance with the condition. 1 5o Thus an estate
"to N to pay his expenses at Purdue University, and i£he fails
to respond to the opportunity, then the estate to revert to the
heirs of T," gives N a vested estate, and if he dies before he
can fulfill the condition his heirs inherit the estate. 1' 5 The court
in the case cited decided it upon the ground that the gift being
"for the benefit solely of the donee, he could claim the gift without applying it to the purpose for which it was given." But
clearly the better ground for the decision is that suggested
above; the condition was a condition subsequent, the performance of which was excused by impossibility.
By the express terms of Section 3502, Burns' Ann. Ind. Stat.
1926, a condition in restraint of marriage annexed to a devise
or bequest to a wife is void. Obviously such a condition contained in a deed, and a condition in a will annexed to a bequest
or devise to one not the wife would be governed by the common
law. Generally, of course, an absolute restraint on marriage,
79 Ind. 167 (1881).
See also, Garrison v. Day, 36 Ind. App. 543 (1905)
147 Maxwell v. Featherstone, 83 Ind. 339 (1882).
348 Clendewrng v. Clymer, 17 Ind. 155 (1861).
149 See Barker v. Petersburg,41 Ind. App. 447 (1907),
man, 182 Ind. 536 (1914).
150 Thomas v. Howell, K. B. 1692, I Salk. 170.
151 Julidn v. McAdams, 85 Ind. App. 639 (1927)
145

146

Hope v. Jack-
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whether by condition, or limitation, was void, but a reasonable
restraint, for example, until D becomes twenty-one, was valid. 52
The Indiana courts have recognized as valid a limitation "until
remarriage" as distinguished from a condition in restraint of
marriage.X53
CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT
An estate may be made subject to a condition subsequent, for
the breach of which the grantor acquires a right of re-entry,
which passes to his heirs. 15 4 There must be a demand of performance and a failure then to perform, in order to perfect the
right of re-entry, 155 but a demand for possession is equivalent
to an entry on the premises, so that actual re-entry is not
necessary. 150
A gift on condition that the donee pay money to the donor,
or another, ordinarily creates a charge on the land, and not a
condition subsequent.,5 7 The language of the instrument may
be such, however, that the payment of money is construed to
be a condition subsequent.'5 8
There is one Indiana case which holds that language restricting the use of property creates a conditional limitation, which
can be enforced by re-entry, and that the right of re-entry here
passes not to the heirs of the grantor, but to his subsequent
grantees.', 9 The latter portion of the decision is clearly erroneous, because the important distinction between a condition, and
a limitation, is that in the latter the estate terminates without
re-entry The grantor's estate takes effect in possession upon
152 Tiff. Real Prop., 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, Sec. 81.
15-3 Levengood v. Hoople, 124 Ind. 27 (1889),

Summit v. Yount, 109
Ind. 506 (1886), Wood v. Beasley, 107 Ind. 37 (1886), Hibbits v. Jacks,
97 Ind. 570 (1884), O'Harrow v. Whitney, 85 Ind. 140 (1882); Harmon v.
Brown, 58 Ind. 207 (1877) ; Thompson v. Patten, 70 Ind. App. 490 (1917) ;
Doe d. Reese v. Campbell, 5 Blackf. 539 (1841), Kelly v. Stinson, 8 Blackf.
.387 (1847).
54 Cross v. Carson, 8 Blackf. 138 (1846),
Hefner v. Yount, 8 Blackf.
455 (1847), Throp v. Johnson, 3 Ind. 343 (1852), Lindsey v. Lindsey, 45
Ind. 553 (1874)
155 Schuff v. Ransom, 79 Ind. 458 (1881)
156 Cory v. Cory, 86 Ind. 567 (1882).
157 Ditchy v. Lee, 167 Ind. 267 (1906), Lindsey v. Lindsey, 45 Ind. 553
(1874), Thomas v. Bond, 13 Ind. 333 (1859), Eikman v. Landwehr, 43 Ind.
App. 724 (1909).
15s Hershman v. Hershman, 63 Ind. 451 (1878) ; Royal v. The Aultman
& Taylor Co., 116 Ind. 424 (1888)
159 Fall Creek School v. Shuman, 55 Ind. App. 232 (1913).

FUTURE INTERESTS IN INDIANA

the happening of the terms of the limitation. If he has not
conveyed the estate it passes to his heirs; if he has conveyed the
estate, then the estate, of course, belongs to his grantee. 160
Ordinarily, language limiting the use of property is construed
to be merely a covenant as to the use, and not a condition subsequent, or a conditional limitation. 101 The language of the instrument if it clearly indicates an intention to create a condition
subsequent as to the use of the property will be so construed. 0 2
But a substantial compliance with the condition is all that is
required, 1 3 and the performance of the condition may be
waived." 4 Likewise if the grantor prevents the performance of
the condition, performance is thereby excused.10 5
POWERS
The validity of a general power of sale given to an executor
was early recognized in Indiana.i6 6 Such a power gave the
executor no right to possession, or the rents and profits.0 7 The
question which most frequently arises is as to whether or not a
general power or disposition may be given to a life tenant without creating in the supposed life tenant a fee simple. Two
early cases held that a gift to W for life, with a general power
of disposition, gave W a fee simple, and that a limitation over
on her death was void for repugnancy. 0 8 Subsequent cases
have had some difficulty in distinguishing these two cases, but
the law of Indiana seems fairly well settled by the later decisions, that a general power of disposition attached to a life
estate does not create a fee. 69 There is one authority to the
1GO Tiff. Real Prop., 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, p. 332.
I'll Brady v. Gregory, 49 Ind. App. 355 (1912),

Newpomt Lodge v.

School Town of Newpoint, 138 Ind. 141 (1894); Higbee v. Rodeman, 129
Ind. 244 (1891).
102 The Indianapolis, Penn., etc., Co. v. Hood, 66 Ind. 581 (1879),
Hunt
v. Beeson, 18 Ind. 380 (1862)
163 Higbee v. Rodeman, 129 Ind. 244 (1891), Jeffersonville Al. & I. R. R.
Co. v. Barbour, 89 Ind. 375 (1883).
Petro v. Casszday, 13 Ind. 289 (1859).
1 ; Elkhart Car Works Co. v. Ellis, 113 Ind. 215 (1887).
1GO Smith v. Addleman, 5 Blac1f. 406 (1840).
167 Thompson v. Schenck, 16 Ind. 194 (1861)
168 Vau Gorden v. Smith, 99 Ind. 404 (1884); Mulvane v. Rude, 146
364

Ind. 476 (1896).
10 Silvers v. Canary, 109 Ind. 267 (1886); Jenksns v. Compton, 123
Ind. 117 (1889); Eubank v. Smiley, 130 Ind. 393 (1891), Wiley v. Gregory, 135 Ind. 647 (1893), Crest v. Schank, 146 Ind. 277 (1896); Rusk v.
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effect that a grantor may reserve a life estate and a general
power of disposition to himself. 17 0
If, of course, the power was not general, but could be exercised
in favor of only a limited group, then the life tenant admittedly
7
got no more than a life estate.' '
A power to sell, if exercised in good faith and for a valuable
consideration gives to the grantee a good estate.1 7 2 If the power
is given to a stranger to the title, then the right of possession
and the rents and profits belong to the heirs,17 8 and if the power
1 4
is unexercised, of course, the title stays in the heirs. 7
Ordinarily the presumption is that the donee of the power
does not exercise the power unless express words are used showing an intention to exercise the power. 175 Two early cases held
that a warranty deed did not exercise the power. 17' 6 The later
7
case of Clark v. Middlesworth,'1
holds that a warranty deed
did exercise the power, and attempts to distinguish the prior
decisions. There is some basis for a distinction; in the first
cases the power was "to appoint in fee," and "to sell in fee,"
while in the last case, there was a general power of disposition.
In South v. South,178 where the power was "to sell in fee"
(identical with the language in Axtel v. Chase), the court followed the Clrk v. Middlesworth case, and held the power to
have been exercised. To a similar effect is the case of Downie
79
v. Buennaget.'
In Crew v. Dixon, 80 the court says that a power can be exercised without mentioning it, (here it was exercised by will),
but the court holds that a power to dispose of "whatever remains
in her hands" gives a power of disposition over the personal
property and not the real estate.
A power to appoint to one or more of several named persons,
Zuck, 147 Ind. 389 (1896); Cross v. Hendry, 39 Ind. App. 246 (1906);
Foudray v. Foudray, 44 Ind. App. 444 (1909)
170 Kokomo Trust Company v. Hiller, 67 Ind. App. 611 (1917).
171 Hopkns v. Gwnn, 93 Ind. 223 (1883).
172 Headley v. Indianapolis S. R. R. Co., 58 Ind. App. 592 (1914).
178Doe d. Clendennng v. Lanus, 3 Ind. 441 (1852), Indiana R. Co. &.
Morgan, 162 Ind. 331 (1903).
174 Hadley v. Hadley, 147 Ind. 423 (1897), Smith v. McCormsek, 46 Ind.

135 (1874).
Frazier v. Hassey, 43 Ind. 310 (1873).
176 Dunning v. Vandusen, 47 Ind. 423 (1874); Axtel v. Chase, 77 Ind.
74 (1881).
'77 82 Ind. 241 (1882).
178 91 Ind. 221 (1883).
175

179 94 Ind. 228 (1883).
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is invalidly exercised if the appointee pays for the exercise of
the power in his favor.' 81 A power to sell to support the grantor
may be exercised after the death of the grantor in order to pay
debts incurred for the support of the grantor during his lifetime. 8 2
LIFE ESTATE, OR FEE
Generally the courts have laid down the rules that:

1.

A gift

of the income, or rents and profits from property is a gift of
the legal title, and entitles the beneficiary to the possession of

the property.'8 3 2.

A gift of a specific life estate in real

property, followed by even a complete power of disposition does
not enlarge the original estate. 8 4 3. Such a gift of personal
85
property, however, gives the beneficiary the entire estate,

although it is, of course, possible to create a life estate in personal property by appropriate words, 8 6 but even here the tes-

tator's intention is finally of controlling influencing, and if from
the entire will there is disclosed an intention to give only a life
estate in personal property the will is so construed, although

the gift appears in the first instance to be absolute.18 7 4. A
general gift of real property gives a fee which cannot be cut

down.' 8 8 5. The effect of Section 3502, Burns' Ann. Ind. Stat.
1926,181 "Every devise in terms denoting the testator's inten180129 Ind. 85 (1891).
181 Beatson v. Bowers, 174 Ind. 601 (1910).
182 McNew v. Vert, 43 Ind. App. 83 (1908)
Stout v. Dunnsug, 72 Ind.
183 Thompson v. chenck, 16 Ind. 194 (1861),
343 (1880), Williams v. Owen, 116 Ind. 70 (1888), Hunt v. Williams, 126
Ind. 493 (1890); Skinner v. Spann, 175 Ind. 672 (1911); Ames v. Cowry
(Ind.App. 1927), 158 N. E. 643.
184 Oliphanzs v. Pumphrey, 193 Ind. 656 (1923), Keplinger v. Keplinger,
185 Ind. 81 (1916), Kooos v. Manifold, 27 Ind. App. 643 (1901); Railsback v. Gordon, 28 Ind. App. 97 (1901), Foudray v. Foudray, 44 Ind. App.
444 (1909); Hall v. Grand Lodge, 55 Ind. App. 324 (1914), Bryson v.
Hicks, 78 Ind. App. 111 (1922); Belton v. Myers (Ind. App.), 154 N. E.
695 (1926); Kepert v. Kepert, 79 Ind. App. 633 (1922); Skznner v. Spann,
175 Ind. 672 (1911), Conover v. Cade, 184 Ind. 604 (1915).
185 Fullenunder v. Watson, 113 Ind. 18 (1887); Stimon v. Rountree,
168 Ind. 169 (1906); Sims v. Ratcliff, 62 Ind. App. 184 (1915).
186 Goudie v. Johnston, 109 Ind. 427 (1886).
187 Lovett v. Lovett (Ind. App.), 155 N. E. 528 (1927).
188 Snodgrass v. Brandenburg, 164 Ind. 59 (1904); Hume v. McHaffie,
40 Ind. App. 703 (1907); Ewart v. Ewart, 70 Ind. App. 167 (1919); Hancock v. Maynard, 72 Ind. App. 661 (1920), Gretner v. Heis, 75 Ind. App.
482 (1921); Logan v. Sills, 28 Ind. App. 170 (1901).
189 Sec. 2, Chap. 11, 2 R. S. 1852.
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tion to devise his entire interest in all his real or personal
property shall be construed to pass all of the estate in such
property, including estates for the life of another, which

he was entitled to devise at his death," seems to be merely that
words of inheritance are not necessary to pass an estate of in-

heritance in a will, if it was the testator's intention to create
an estate of inheritance.

10

This statute has been construed in the case of Wolf v. Wolf,' 91
as having no effect upon the common law rule that after acquired
real estate did not pass by a will, where all of the testator's
property was not disposed of by the will. It would seem,
a fortwtr, that it would have no effect as far as the character
of the estate was concerned unless the will absolutely disposed
of every piece of the testator's property, and in such a case, as

far as real estate is concerned, words of inheritance may be

192
necessary to give more than a life estate.

RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE

There are repeated expressions in the cases in Indiana that
the Rule in Shelley's Case is law in Indiana, but those statements,
like almost all other statements, must be taken with some qualifications. To begin with the word "heirs" has been quite freely
interpreted to mean "children."' '3 Although the courts have
refused to interpret "children" as meaning "heirs."' 9
Usually, of course, a conveyance or devise to A, and remainder to his heirs, or the heirs of his body, has been held to
call for the application of the rule. 0

5

1,90
Logan v. Sills, 28 Ind. App. 170 (1901), Brookover v. Branyan, 185
Ind. 1 (1916), Korf v. Geriehs, 145 Ind. 134 (1896). But see Coil v.
Schelter, 85 Ind. App. 528 (1926)
1',"
73 Ind. App. 221 (1920).
192 Lambert's Lessee v. Pane, 3 Cranch 97, 2 L. Ed. 377.
But see
Doe d. Rush v. Kinney, 3 Ind. 50 (1851); Pattison v. Doe, 7 Ind. 282
(1856) ("heirs" not necessary to give a fee by will), and Neilson v. Lagow,
4 Ind. 609 (1853) ("heirs" not necessary to give a fee, by trust deed)
1:3 Rapp v. Matthsas, 35 Ind. 332 (1871), Owen v. Cooper, 46 Ind. 524
(1874), Ridgeway v. Lanphear, 99 Ind. 251 (1884), Brunfield V. Drook,
101 Ind. 191 (1884), Hadloek v. Gray, 104 Ind. 596 (1885), Millett v.
Ford, 109 Ind. 159 (1886), Jackson v. Jackson, 127 Ind. 346 (1890);
Granger v. Granger, 147 Ind. 95 (1896).
11,4Doe d. Patterson v. .lacknam, 5 Ind. 283 (1854), Sorden v. Gatewood, 1 Ind. 107 (1848)
1,95
Tipton v. LaRose, 27 Ind. 484 (1867); Andrews v. Spurlin, 35 Ind.
262 (1871), MeCray v. Lzpp, 35 Ind. 116 (1871); Lennen v. Craig, 95 Ind.
167 (1883); Hochstedler v. Hochstedler, 108 Ind. 506 (1886); Taney v.
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In the two most recent cases decided by the Appellate Court
the rule has been laid down with some emphasis that "Every
devise coming within the rule in Shelley's case is controlled by
it, even though the actual intent of the testator is thereby
thwarted."'190 But the Supreme Court has said, "It is settled
law that the rule in Shelley's case will not be allowed to defeat
the plain intention of the testator."'19s
In the earlier cases there certainly seems to be a somewhat
more liberal construction in regard to the application of the
rule, than now obtains.
FEE TAIL
Section 36, Chap. 23, 1 R. S. 1852, p. 238109 provides "Estates
tail are abolished; and an estate which, according to the common
law, would be adjudged a fee tail, shall hereafter be adjudged
a fee simple; and if no valid remainder shall be limited thereon,
shall be a fee simple absolute."
At common law the creation of a fee tail left a reversion in
the grantor or testator. This could be sold by the reversioner,
or if undisposed of passed to his heirs. By the same instrument
in which the fee tail was created remainders could also be
created, so that the grantor or testator thereby disposed of his
entire estate in the land.20 0 The statute in question certainly
seems to transform a fee tail into a fee simple only where the
reversion is undisposed of by the instrument creating the fee
tail.
In each of the cases cited in the note the first portion of the
statute was given effect, there being no attempt to create a
20
remainder after the fee tail. '
Fahnley, 126 Ind. 88 (1890); Perkins v. McConnell, 136 Ind. 384 (1893);
Bonner v. Bonner, 28 Ind. App. 147 (1901) ; Lamb v. Medsker, 35 Ind. App.
662 (1905); Lee v. Lee, 45 Ind. App. 645 (1909); Newhans v. Brennan,
49 Ind. App. 654 (1912).
106 Gibson v. Brown, 62 Ind. App. 460 (1915), at p. 476; MeCllen v.
Seliker, 70 Ind. App. 435 (1919).
1745

Ind. 295 (1873).

198 MeMahan v. Newcomer, 82 Ind. 565 (1882). See also Earnhart v.
Earnhart, 127 Ind. 397 (1890); Shmer v. Mann, 99 Ind. 190 (1884),
although in the last case the rule was applied.
199 Sec. 13412, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
200 Tiff. Real Prop., 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, Sec. 23, and p. 480.
201 A drews v. Spurlin, 35 Ind. 262 (1871); Tipton v. LaRose, 27 Ind.
484 (1867), Perkins v. McConnell, 136 Ind. 384 (1893); Gibson v. Brown,
62 Ind. App. 460 (1915).
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There are five cases in which there was involved a question
of the application of the statute or prior statutes as against an
20 2
attempted remainder after the fee tail. In Gonzales v. Barton,
the testator gave real estate to W for life, remainder to S for
life in fee tail to his lawful issue, remainder in fee to his heirs.
The court held that the statute applied so as to give S a fee
simple, and there is no discussion as to the effect' of the
attempted remainder over.
In Chase v. Salisbury,20 3 T gave to W and D, with full power
to sell and convey, and should W and S die without issue the
estate to revert to N. The case was decided under Sect. 57,
Acts 1843, p. 424, which provided that where a remainder in
fee is limited upon an estate which, before the abolition of
estates tail, would have been adjudged a fee tail, shall be
deemed a contingent remainder, vesting in possession upon the
death of the first taker. The court construed the will as giving
in the first instance a fee simple, and not a conditional fee or fee
tail, so that the statute was held to have no possible application.
In McIlhinny v. McIlhinny,204 A conveyed to D for life, remainder to the issue of her body born alive, and remainder over
to J if D die without issue born alive. D in fact has a child
born alive and the child and D sue to quiet title against J. The
court held that "issue" meant children, overruling the two
earlier cases of King v. Rea,2)5 and Fletcher v. Fletcher,20 6 and
that therefore D took a life estate, and not a fee tail, and the
unborn children took a contingent fee, which vested in the child
which was born, so that the contingency upon which J's estate
might possibly vest having become impossible of occurrence J
had no further interest in the property The result would be
the same had the court held that the rule in Shelley's did apply,
for admitting that D got a fee tail, which was a fee simple under
the statute, it was admitted that the contingent remainder was
valid under what is now Sec. 13414 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926,
providing that "A remainder may be limited on a contingency,
which, in case it should happen, will operate to abridge or determine the precedent estate." That is, the statute permits the
creation by deed of what would be an executory interest under
a will or trust, under the name of contingent remainder. But
202 45 Ind. 295 (1873).
203 73 Ind. 506 (1881).
204 137 Ind. 411 (1898).
205 56 Ind. 1.
206

88 Ind. 418.
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here again, clearly, events having made the contingency impossible the so-called contingent remainder was loss. The result is
that even if the statute operates to give the first taker a fee
simple, still, of course, the fee thus created may be subject to
any contingency or limitation, good under the "Statute against
Perpetuities." Whether or not what would be a vested remainder can still be created, thus making the estate of the first
taker in fact a fee tail is another question.
20 7
The case under discussion contains some peculiar language,
"Such a deed would have conveyed what is known at common
law as a conditional estate or fee, called an estate tail liable to
be defeated by the failure of the condition, namely, issue of her
body born alive, and failure of the contingent remainderman J
to be living at the termination of her life estate. In such a
case, at common law, the estate would revert, as we have seen,
to the donor. But our statute, as we have seen, changes that
feature of the estate and makes a fee simple in the first taker,
unless there was a valid remainder over limited to the issue of
her body or, on failure of such issue, to J. The remainder
limited was a valid one, both under the statute, and at common
law." The court seems to say that after all D did get a fee tail,
but it distinctly holds later on in the opinion that the child got
a vested remainder in fee on birth, so that the language quoted
must be discounted.
In Adams v. Merrill, 20 G, by deed, gave to D for life, and at
her death "to vest in the children and heirs of the body of D,
and if D die without leaving any heirs of her body living at the
time of her death, then on her death to X." The court held
that "children" meant natural children, so that an adopted
son did not take under the deed, and that even if the Rule in
Shelley's case applied there was a valid contingent remainder
to X. The problem here, and the result, are almost identical
with that of Mcllhinney v. Mellhinney, supra. The opinion contains this language: "Our statute contemplates that a valid
remainder may be limited after what would be an estate tail at
Common Law." 20 9 "The Rule in Shelley's Case has no application." 210 "Whether D took an estate tail or a determinable fee,
in either case it was limited to the children and heirs of her body
207
208

209

At p. 419.
45 Ind. App. 315 (1909).
At p. 323.

210 At p. 325.
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living at the time of her decease,-and there was a valid contingent remainder to (X)."211
Here again there was what was construed to be a contingent
remainder by deed, operating to cut off a prior estate in fee.
In Lamb v. Medsker,2 12, H and W, by deed (in 1838), gave
to A and B, and "to the survivor of- them, and to the legitimate
heirs of said A, if he should have any, and in case no such lawful
issue, then after the death of both, to the heirs of H, to be considered part of his estate." The case was decided under the
Act of 1826, p. 50, Sec. 5, which provided that estates tail were
abolished "and any person or persons who may hereafter be
seized of an estate tail, by devise or grant, shall be deemed to be
seized of the same in fee simple absolute." The court holds that
the Rule in Shelley's Case applied and that A and B got a fee
simple under the statute. Nothing whatever is said concerning the limitation to the heirs of H, but the effect of the decision
is that it was invalid, being limited on a fee simple.
Again the cases do not throw much light on the proper construction of the statute. Although the statute purports to abolish estates tail, it also provides that a valid remainder may be
limited on what would have been an estate tail at Common Law.
At common law either a vested or contingent remainder could
be created by deed after an estate tail (without the use of a
trustee). An executory interest could as well be limited on an
estate tail as it could on a fee simple. It was, of course, subject
to the Rule against Perpetuities. Neither a vested or contingent
remainder after an estate tail was effected by the Rule against
Perpetuities. The contingent remainder could be destroyed by
barring the estate tail, and was therefore unobjectionable.
Can one then, in Indiana, still create a fee tail by creating
a vested remainder after the fee tail? There is no suggestion in
the cases as to what the answer will be. It is submitted, however, that again the word "remainder" must be construed to
mean "executory interest," as in the subsequent sections of the
same statute. It seems rather plain that the legislature intended
to really "abolish estates tail," and that the last clause of the
statute was added for the purpose of saving any question concerning the validity of any executory interest. The last clause,
therefore, does not add anything to the result of the first portion
211 The court also held that the contingent remainder passed to the
heirs of X upon his death, under Sections 900 and 3325, Burns Ann. Ind.
Stat 1926.
212 35 Ind. App. 662 (1905).
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of the statute. The result of the statute is that an estate tail
becomes a fee simple under the statute, and that a valid executory interest may be limited upon the first estate the same as
it could on any fee simple, and that under Sec. 13414, Burns
Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926, a contingent remainder in a deed is given
effect as an executory interest.
ESTATES POUR AUTRE VIE
There is but one case in Indiana on this subject. 213 Here A
conveyed to trustees for H and W, during the life or period of
their natural lives, and after the death of the survivor to the
children of H. H died before W, and his children sue to partition the property, subject to the life estate of W. H died testate,
but what his will contained did not appear in the record. It was
held that H had an estate for the life of W, but that upon his
death, not being an estate of inheritance, it did not pass to his
heirs, and that therefore the children had no present possessory
interest which would entitle them to maintain a suit to parti214
tion.
On the record the decision of the court was clearly correct
if the Common Law on the subject is still in force in Indiana.
Such an estate did not pass to the heirs because it was not an
estate of inheritance, and it did not pass to the executors, because it was a freehold estate. Anyone who took possession
became the owner as the "general occupant. ' 215 But it would
seem that quite certainly under the Indiana Statute of Descents
the life estate being "real estate" passed to the children and
widow. 216 Under Sec. 1261, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926, the
children were, therefore, entitled to partition.
213

Graham v. Sinclair, 83 Ind. App. 58, 147 N. E. 634 (1925).

This

case is included in this paper because it is interesting and subject to
criticism. See also the criticism of Professor H. A. Bigelow, 20 Ill. Law
Review 299.
214 Had the will been in the record the chances are that the estate pour
autre vie did pass, under Sec. 3502, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926, providing
that all of the property of the testator passes under a will, denoting that
intention, "including estates for the life of another."
215 Tiff. Real Prop., 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, Sec. 35.
210 Secs. 3325 and 3337, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926, and Sec. 900,
Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926. Lamb v. Medsker, 35 Ind. App. 662 (1905).
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